PEACE REPORT

DECEMBER, 1961 SPECIAL PRICE: 35 CENTS VOL. I, NO. 9



An H Bomb on New York City

WHAT WOULD IT REALLY BE LIKE? ..... *Scientist's Report*

They Can't Imagine a WARLESS WORLD ..... *By Walter Millis*

What YOU Can DO for PEACE ..... *Editorial*

THE MARCH OF EVENTS

The "quiet panic" over fallout shelters shows, if nothing else, that most Americans think the chances of war have increased. For years they were able to deny the existence of the nuclear threat by telling themselves that today's weapons were too horrible for anyone to actually use. But the Berlin crisis and the Soviet Union's long series of tests shook them at last into realizing that thermonuclear war is a genuine possibility. Faced with this stark realization, many Americans have grabbed at the hope offered them by some of their leaders, including President Kennedy, that they may save themselves by building shelters.

The reason the shelter debate has raged so ferociously is that, while the facts are fairly well established as to what damage will be caused by a given bomb detonated at a given height, no one can do more than surmise how many bombs would be exploded, and where, in a nuclear war. Thus Governor Rockefeller can build the first approved fallout shelter in New York City at 810 Fifth Avenue and physicist Willard Libby can boast of his $30 shelter built of sandbags behind his Bel Air home in Southern California. It is true that a fallout shelter offers short-term protection if a nuclear weapon is exploded at ground level a good distance away and the winds carry fallout in that direction. But if a big thermonuclear bomb were exploded over either New York City or Los Angeles it is probable that huge firestorms would sweep over thousands of square miles, killing those in shelters by either heat or carbon monoxide poisoning. In the case of Libby's shelter, a fire that may have been started by nothing larger than a lighted cigarette burned off a broad area including Libby's house and the roof of his fallout shelter made out of railroad ties. Inspecting the caved-in shelter afterward, Libby said, "The ties would have worked fine against radioactive fallout. I've said all along that my shelter will work." This is true, but it is also true than an enemy desiring to knock out Southern California's defense industries would be likely to use an air burst, causing fire and making such a shelter a probable grave.

Perhaps the shelter situation was best summarized by James Reston, of *The New York Times*: "The situation, to state it mildly, is a mess. The president has been talking about it publicly for months, but he is just beginning for the first time to study the problem to see whether there is any sense in what he has already said." If the aroused American people themselves study the problem, they hopefully may develop more enthusiasm for another subject that, like civil defense, has not been taken very seriously heretofore, namely, disarmament.

New talks on disarmament now appear probable if Cold War tensions over Berlin and other hot spots do not mount further. The first step looks like another round of the "numbers game." The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. recently finished long discussions as to the proper number of under secretaries for new Secretary General U Thant. This dispute was resolved by an agreement to "Let U Thant do it"—so he is choosing his own.

The question now is the composition of the forum to discuss disarmament. The Soviet Union wants a quintuple troika—15 members, with five each from the Western, Soviet and neutral worlds. The U.S. is seeking a 20-nation body, with five Western, five Soviet and 10 representatives from other parts of the world. The U.S. is also willing to accept these alternatives: 10 nations (five Western, five Soviet bloc), 13 nations (five and five plus three neutral observers) or the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which consists of all 103 members. The General Assembly's Political Committee voted by acclamation a resolution urging the two powers to agree on composition of the forum and report back to the Assembly at this session. The session, scheduled to end Dec. 20, may continue early next year after a holiday recess.

On the question of the nuclear test ban treaty, the Russians, after stating that they would never, ever talk about a test ban treaty separate from a treaty for general and complete disarmament, suddenly agreed on Nov. 21 to resume the test ban talks. Their current intentions should be evident soon in Geneva.

Three chronic problems — Berlin, the Congo and the question of Chinese representation in the U.N.—remained chronic.

On Berlin, the four Western powers struggled with little apparent success to achieve a common policy, although Kennedy and Adenauer drew together somewhat in talks at Washington, D. C.

Within the Congo, the struggle between the central government and the rebellious governments of Tshombe and Gizenga continued, with the United Nations inextricably entangled. And on the East River, the U.N.'s financial picture steadily worsened as a result. One new development was the suggestion of a special 15-nation study committee that the World Court be asked to rule on whether or not member nations are legally bound under the Charter to pay for operations like the Congo forces and UNEF in the Gaza Strip.

As the General Assembly, for the first time in 11 years, prepared to debate the question of Red Chinese admission, a strange silence on the matter was noted in U.N. corridors. India, in the past a champion of Red Chinese admission, seems less enthusiastic as a result of new Chinese incursions into her border areas. The Soviet Union, while it makes its customary demands for the seating of Mainland China, does not seem to have its heart in the matter—no doubt as the result of its ideological troubles with Peiping. For its part, the U.S. seems able to drum up little support for its plan to have a committee study the matter for a year.

NEXT MONTH: Special issue on "What You Should Know About Germ and Chemical Warfare," with the lead article by Brig. Gen. J. H. Rothschild, USA-Ret.

In Scandinavia, where public opinion is ahead of the rest of the world in recognizing the need for a strong world organization, two encouraging developments are taking place.

The Danish government has called upon Een Verden (which means "One World"), a large organization of private citizens, to devise a plan for United Nations reform including a permanent U.N. police force. If accepted by the government, the plan will be offered to the U.N. next year, perhaps with other countries joining as sponsors. Chairman of the Een Verden committee is Per Haekkerup, head of the Danish delegation to the U.N. Two years ago the Danes presented a plan for a permanent U.N. police force, but were unable to win sufficient support for it.

Meanwhile, as a further pledge of Scandinavian support for world order, plans are moving ahead for Sweden, Norway and Denmark to establish on their own initiative a permanent force available to the U.N. secretary general on six to 12 hours notice. Negotiations are now being carried on between the defense ministries to establish joint command over the forces. There is some possibility that Finland will join the plan. If all goes well, the U.N. may have some troops at its immediate disposal for the first time in its history by early next year.

WAR/PEACE REPORT

Current Fact and Opinion on Progress Toward a World of Law and Order

December, 1961 © 1961 by War/Peace Report, Inc. Vol. 1, No. 9
Editor: Richard Hudson
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Published monthly by War/Peace Report, Inc., 305 West 18th Street, New York 11, N.Y. War/Peace Report, Inc., is a non-profit corporation: Richard Hudson, president; Melvin Dubin, vice president; Carl F. Schmidt, secretary; Morris Abrams, treasurer; Leo E. Devendorf and Dr. Richard C. Rodgers, members of the board.

All editorial, advertising and subscription correspondence should be addressed to *War/Peace Report*, 305 West 18th Street, New York 11, N. Y. Telephone: ORegon 5-1809, VIrginia 6-3200. Printed in the U.S.A. Subscription price is 50 cents per copy, $7.50 per year, in all countries of the world. Changes of address should be accompanied by old address as well as new. Please give four weeks' notice.

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An H Bomb on New York City

What Would It Really Be Like?

A scientific report considers all the effects: Heat, blast, fire, radiation, social disruption, genetic effects reaching at least 50 generations into the future.

In flesh and blood terms, what would a thermonuclear explosion over a city mean — at the time of the blast, in the days, weeks and months following, and to generations as yet unborn?

Let us assume one 20-megaton thermonuclear device (equivalent to 20 million tons of TNT) is exploded two miles above Columbus Circle in midtown Manhattan.

As the bomb explodes, the sky fills with a bluish-white incandescence whose heat at the center approaches that of the sun itself. It rapidly expands until it is four miles wide. To the west it spans the Hudson River; to the east it reaches across the East River to Queens. Times Square, Rockefeller Center, big ocean liners, Central Park, the United Nations are instantly incinerated.

Material in the fireball begins to condense and spread out as it reaches altitudes of five to 10 miles, thus forming the mushroom cloud. About 25 miles up, it burns itself out. Meanwhile, a huge pressure wave traveling initially at speeds many times that of sound has spread out from the center of the explosion, crushing everything in its path until it gradually loses its force. Immediately behind this shock front comes the wind at speeds initially exceeding a thousand miles per hour, toppling whatever might still be standing. (Structures like telephone poles and radio towers which might resist the shock front are much more vulnerable to the winds that follow.)

The outward-rushing wind, which creates a giant vacuum in the central area, gradually loses its force as it moves into the suburbs, and the surrounding air rushes back into the city. These reverse winds, in turn, fan the fires that have been started by the bomb's heat and also as a result of blast effects (for example, broken gas mains, electrical short circuits and upset stoves). It is conservatively estimated that a 20-megaton detonation could start at least one million fires within the limits of New York City alone. Even if the fire department, which normally handles about 150 fires a day, somehow remained intact, it could not cope with the conflagration. But, like other New Yorkers, most of the 12,000-man force would be unable to respond. Moreover, their equipment would not be operative, and even if it were the lack of water pressure and the streets lined with rubble would make effective counter measures impossible. So the unchecked fires would probably coalesce to form a firestorm which could cover a circular area from 30 to 50 miles across, or even more. Like a fire burning beneath a chimney, a firestorm sucks in air from around its edges, creating winds at its edges with up to hurricane force.

What would have happened to the people under and around the burst?

The study indicates that almost six million out of eight million New Yorkers would have died within the first few days, mostly from blast and heat. If the burst occurred on a weekday, when 900,000 commuters were in the city, the figure would be correspondingly higher. In the suburbs many more would die in the first few days from blast and heat.

Near the center, most people would be killed almost instantly from the heat. At distances of up to 27 miles from ground zero an individual might receive third degree burns; second degree burns may be suffered by persons up to 32 miles away; first degree burns would occur at 45 miles. Second and third degree burns received under such circumstances could well prove fatal.

The other great immediate cause of death and injuries would be blast effects. However, very few would die as a direct result of the shock wave, for the human body can stand fairly high pressures. A person close to the burst would more likely be killed first either by heat or other blast effects. For the same reason, immediate nuclear radiation would not be an important cause of death.

The most dangerous blast effects result from falling buildings and their contents, and from people being picked up by winds and hurled against hard surfaces. For a forewarned population that took cover indoors, falling buildings would probably be responsible for more initial casualties than any other single factor. Blast damage to a building may happen in various ways. A building may be blown over, or its four walls

This article is based on a paper, "The Anticipated Biological and Environmental Effects of Detonating a 20 Megaton Weapon on Columbus Circle," prepared by Dr. Tom Stonier for the Scientists' Committee for Radiation Information. Presented to the New York Academy of Sciences on Nov. 13, the paper is about 100 pages long, highly technical and heavily documented. Among the many unclassified sources used were, especially, "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," published by the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the published hearings of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy held in May and June, 1959, under the chairmanship of Rep. Chet Holifield. Prior to its presentation, the paper was circulated for criticism among many competent scientists. This adaptation has been made by the editors of *War/Peace Report* with the approval of Dr. Stonier.

may collapse inwards because of external pressure. An already weakened building may be damaged further by the violent outward wind following the shock front and then by the rush of air back in to fill the partial vacuum. In addition to all this, there is the ground shock, which, like an earthquake, may tumble a building.

The bomb could totally destroy ordinary unreinforced brick or wood-frame houses 10 miles away; such homes 20 miles away would remain standing but would need major repairs. Some damage, such as broken windows, would be incurred by most structures 50 miles or more away. There would be many individual variations, depending on the peculiarities of construction and behavior of the shock front. The explosion of a mere 20-kiloton bomb (with one-thousandth the power of this one) has been known occasionally to break windows 75 to 100 miles away.

If the 20-megaton burst were at ground level on Columbus Circle, it would blast a hole, in granite, half a mile wide and 240 feet deep, big enough to contain a 20-story building. This would penetrate all three subway systems. Since a blast wave traveling in a tunnel loses its energy much more slowly than when it is traveling in the open air, the death-dealing force could be expected to run through the entire underground-connected portion of the subway system.

The second major blast effect is "displacement of a biological target" — the hurling of a man against a hard surface. Experts have determined that for a 160-pound man serious head and skeletal injuries occur if the velocity of the body exceeds 10 feet per second at the moment it collides with a hard surface. With a 20-megaton ground burst, a 160-pound man would achieve this critical velocity after having traveled only one foot if he were 8.5 miles from the blast, or after 10 feet if he were 15.6 miles distant.

For those who survived the immediate heat and blast, the next great problem would be the firestorm.

Firestorms would be an almost inevitable consequence of bombings in the megaton range on a large city, according to W. T. Ham in testimony before the Holifield Committee.

"Just what measures can be adopted for survival during a firestorm are not readily apparent," he said. "Survivors of the initial effects of blast, thermal and ionizing radiation from a megaton burst must cope also with the incinerating heat of firestorms. Severe burn casualties from secondary fires will outnumber vastly flash burn casualties from the fireball."

One of the firestorms on which the most complete data is available occurred in Hamburg on July 27, 1943. In this raid 60,000 inhabitants of the city perished, almost as many as were killed in the atom bombing of Hiroshima. Wind velocity exceeded 150 miles per hour; burning gases rose to 15,000 feet; temperatures exceeded 1,400° F. In view of the current interest in shelters, it is noteworthy to observe the fate of people in air raid shelters in the Hamburg firestorm.

Many persons were simply cooked to death as if they had been in an oven. In other shelters people were found in positions indicating they had died unaware of the imminent danger. Some of these evidently were victims of heat stroke. A much larger percentage, however, showed characteristics of carbon monoxide poisoning. Wood fires normally contain 3 per cent carbon monoxide; a concentration of .5 per cent in the air may cause death after one hour's exposure.

Died While Fleeing

Others in Hamburg remained in their shelters too long before attempting to flee the firestorm; only those who escaped in the early stages had any hope of reaching safety. Once the heat became unbearable, hundreds of persons were seen leaving shelters and running into the streets, where they slowly collapsed, as if from utter exhaustion. Many who died this way were found naked. Somehow the heat or fire burned their clothing, except for their shoes, yet only singed their skin.

It is thus apparent that the most serious threat to a population surrounding a target area may well be the firestorm. Obviously, this matter has the utmost significance in appraising any shelter program. The key question is the probable extent of the firestorm. In the case of the low air burst of the 20-megaton weapon, the firestorm might extend well beyond New York City limits, probably on the average at least 18 miles from Columbus Circle.

In spite of the wide public discussion of the potential fallout threat,

If It Were 50 Megatons . . .

The study on which this article is based was begun about a year ago when a 20-megaton weapon was considered the largest in nuclear arsenals. Recently, however, the Soviet Union detonated a 57-megaton device, although it had intended only a 50-megaton blast. The map at the right shows what a 50-megaton bomb exploded over Wall Street would do to the New York metropolitan area: At 2.75 miles, all but the heaviest concrete buildings leveled; at 14 miles, blast sufficient to destroy or damage most homes; at 35 miles, fatal burns to those exposed, wooden homes burned; at 45 miles, fires in dried leaves, similar matter; at 49 miles, second degree burns of any exposed persons. Although Khrushchev has boasted of a 100-megaton bomb and some scientists state that even 500 and 1,000-megaton bombs are possible, it is generally agreed that more devastation can be caused by using more of the relatively smaller weapons.



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this hazard is at least as uncertain and perhaps much more difficult to predict in detail than any of the preceding hazards. Unfortunately, almost every assumption that needs to be made in this type of calculation is uncertain: The smooth contours set forth in theoretical calculations are produced by simplified wind structures, and these often do not exist. At several altitudes winds may show varying velocities and varying directions. Thus a five-megaton burst of the 1956 Redwing series in the Pacific produced a fallout pattern resembling a maple leaf. In that instance, one hour after the blast the radiation at hot spots 50 miles away was found to be two-and-a-half times as much as at the explosion site itself.

Many other assumptions on fallout must be questioned. One is that 80 per cent of the radioactive material produced will return to earth as local fallout. It could be much less. Another problem is that all information on local fallout has been obtained from kiloton bursts on silicate, or megaton bursts on coral sand. Fallout resulting from a surface burst in a city on granite might possess quite different properties from those studied so far. Large amounts of iron condensing early in the cloud would influence particle formation and rate of descent. It is also difficult to assess the contribution of radiation from such structural materials as steel, glass and concrete, containing sodium, silicon, iron, copper, zinc, manganese and cobalt.

Another question mark is weathering — what happens to fallout after it has settled. Not much is known, and what there is, is classified. As physicist Ralph E. Lapp has pointed out, there is an urgent need for reliable data on the physical and chemical behavior of fallout particles on soil surfaces, building materials and surfaced roads. One would also expect an effect on plant and animal life as they relate to soil surfaces.

Hot Spots Vary

It is clear from the foregoing that it is impossible to predict what the fallout situation would be in any specific New York locality in the event that a 20-megaton weapon were detonated on Columbus Circle. If the burst were at ground level, the fallout field might be expected to be about 4,000 square miles, with some hot spots where one could receive a fatal dose in two minutes, while in others it might require 40 minutes. If winds were as they were on October 17, 1958 (the day of the attack for the Holifield hearings) — west-southwest at an average of 40 miles per hour — Long Island would be inundated by fallout.

If, however, the burst were in the air, there would be relatively little local fallout. If the burst were above most of the atmosphere, 20 miles or more up, there would be no local fallout, less blast damage, but greater heat damage. In this case a person 40 miles away (or even more) looking directly at the fireball could be permanently blinded; permanent burns to the retina are possible at distances of more than 300 miles. Thus, fallout effect is maximized with a ground burst; blast effect with a low air burst; heat effect with a high air burst. If an enemy had ample bombs, he might explode several at various altitudes to achieve the various effects.

Like the physical considerations of fallout, the biological considerations are also uncertain. Human populations exposed to relatively high levels of fallout have been small. There was virtually no fallout in Japan since both detonations involved air rather than surface bursts. All radiation injuries resulted from the initial nuclear radiation. The best data comes from studies of Marshall Islanders, American service personnel and Japanese fishermen accidentally injured following the detonation of a nuclear device in the Pacific in the spring of 1954.

While it is not possible to make a reasonable estimate of radiation deaths from the 20-megaton bomb, it is possible to give this rule of thumb as to the survivability of exposed persons: If vomiting occurs promptly within a few hours and continues and is followed in rapid succession by prostration, diarrhea and fever, death is almost certain to follow within a week. If vomiting occurs early and is of relatively short duration, and is followed by a period of well-being, there is a strong chance that symptoms of serious radiation sickness, which may or may not be fatal, will begin to develop within a few weeks. Persons who have been exposed but show no external symptoms of radiation sickness may still be significantly affected since even sublethal doses of radiation lower defenses against infection.

Assuming an individual in the New York area has survived heat, blast, firestorm and fallout, what will be his further problems in a post-attack world? First, what would it mean for New York City to have been destroyed? Consider what New York City was:

The city itself had a population of eight million, and another five million lived nearby. It was the financial capital of the non-Communist world, home of the U.N., corporate capital of the nation, center of American culture, the nation's No. 1 manufacturing city, the leading wholesale and retail market of the country, the transportation hub of the Northeast and the country's major communications center. The 17-county New York-Northeastern New Jersey Standard Metropolitan area contained 10 per cent of the nation's total labor force, 12 per cent of its managers, 15 per cent of its physicians, 16 per cent of its accountants, auditors, architects, chemists and electrical engineers, 20 per cent of the nation's reresearch laboratories. Thus in a single blow the U. S. was deprived of perhaps five to 10 per cent of its economic capacity.

In considering the social and economic disruption following this detonation of 20 megatons over Columbus Circle, it would be unrealistic to assume that the rest of the country had not been hit. When Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed (with weapons only one-thousandth as potent as a 20-megaton bomb), the rest of Japan was able to render help to survivors. In this case it must be presumed that other, if not all, metropolitan areas, as well as many minor cities and other targets, have been destroyed. In a general way, some of the problems may be imagined.

Medicine Short

Medical treatment is available to only a small minority of people. Most of New York's 50,000 hospital beds have been destroyed, and even if they haven't they can scarcely accommodate the millions of injured. Many doctors and nurses have been killed, drug and plasma supply sources have been mostly destroyed. Thus even those with minor injuries are likely to succumb; second and third degree burns almost always become infected. Malnutrition, sublethal doses of radiation, fatigue and emotional stress further aggravate minor ailments. Epidemics are highly probable. They could be made certain if the enemy introduced diseases such as typhus, influenza, cholera or plague through bacteriological warfare.

Sources of power have largely ceased to be available beginning at the time of attack, and what sources remain are rapidly running out. Electricity may be available for a while in some areas where the producing

facilities are intact, but as coal stocks are exhausted they will have to shut down. There is no way to transport more coal to the plants. Many gas tanks and mains have exploded, disrupting that source of energy. Gasoline supplies are rapidly being exhausted and cannot be replaced, as transportation systems are too damaged to transport the gasoline. Thus most people, even if not immediately, will soon be deprived of the use of their radio, television, telephone, automobile, stove, refrigerator, sink, bathtub, toilet, furnace and electric lights.

Water Problems

Water supplies can be destroyed in two ways: by contamination of reservoirs with fallout and by destruction of parts of the water supply system, such as mains and water towers. Also, without power, pumps cannot operate to put water into the system. Aside from the supply problems, it would probably be from two to four days before the water in open reservoirs hit by fallout would reach a level of radioactivity low enough to be acceptable. (The reason water would be drinkable after so short a time, although it would not be considered "safe" by present standards, is that only a small part of fallout is soluble in water.) Since it will take considerable time to repair supply systems, survivors may have to go to the reservoirs on foot or dig their own wells.

Food supplies have been interrupted on many levels. Large areas of land have been made so radioactive that farmers cannot work them safely for weeks or months. In the 4,000 square miles presumed hit with fallout from a surface burst on Columbus Circle, farmers would have to wait two years before the radioactivity fell to the level now considered safe for workers in atomic industries. Crops hit by heavy fallout have been ruined by radioactivity. Many food warehouses and processing plants have been destroyed, and those that remain have no power to operate. Finally, all transportation systems — rail, air and highways — have been so disrupted that food can move only sporadically. The consumer himself has to walk (or ride a bicycle perhaps) to any possible sources of food supply.

Money has become virtually worthless. It is no longer possible to pay by check because the nation's banking system is totally disrupted. Washington, D.C., presumably has been destroyed in the attack, and along with it the Federal Reserve System. Where banks are still intact, they have been the victim of runs by panic-stricken survivors. Not having sufficient currency to cover their accounts (as no bank ever does), the banks have been forced to shut their doors. Insurance companies are out of business. Even what currency is available is of little value. What trade there is, is carried on by barter.

Housing is an immense problem. In the case of New York City, even without a firestorm, it is highly probable that very few, if any, of the city's two-and-a-half million dwellings would provide adequate shelter. There is considerable blast and fire damage in the suburbs, and, as indicated previously, fallout would be distributed in an unpredictable manner over some 4,000 square miles. In the Holifield hearings, which assumed a "modest" attack of about 1,500 megatons on the entire nation, C. K. Shafer stated that out of the nation's 46.1 million dwellings, 11.8 million would suffer severe damage from blast, 8.1 million moderate damage and 1.5 million slight damage. Of those not damaged by blast, 500,000 dwellings would be hit by an amount of fallout requiring them to be evacuated for a year; another 2.1 million would have to be abandoned for several months; another 10.4 million could be made available for living 60 days after the attack—but only after major decontamination had been carried out. Thus, of the 46.1 million total dwellings, only 11.7 million, or about one out of four, could be inhabited during the first 60 days following the attack. If the attack occurred during the winter it would be difficult to imagine the hardship of survivors, as they faced the lack of housing, heat, food and medical supplies.

Yet another post-attack problem is the breakdown of the social organization. Government and law enforcement, since communications have been largely destroyed, quickly revert to the local level. With problems of hunger, sickness and lack of housing, disputes are inevitable, and many of them are settled by violence. Marauding bands of desperate refugees could become a problem in areas that have suffered relatively less damage.

Despite this catalogue of horrors, there will probably be some long-term survivors of the attack, although perhaps not very many from the New York metropolitan area. What will the long-term effects of the attack be on these persons and their progeny? Here the information is really scant. Nevertheless, there are a few clues.

Studies of survivors of the Japanese bombings indicate that those exposed to radiation there have had a higher incidence than normal of leukemia and cancer of the lung, stomach, breast, ovary and uterine cervix. A higher death rate from all causes was also noted in the exposed Japanese population. It is established that radiation leads to formation of cataracts, with babies being particularly vulnerable.

Radiation can also cause sterility. The gonads are among the most radiation-sensitive organs of the body. Likewise, radiation damage to the ovaries in the female can cause profound atrophy of the organ resulting in temporary or permanent sterility, depending on the dose.

Development Retarded

Studies of exposed Japanese children have shown that radiation has probably had the effect of retarding their skeletal development and growth in weight and height. Particularly deleterious is the effect of radiation on the embryo. A high percentage of Japanese women who were pregnant at the time of exposure had abnormal terminations of their pregnancies.

Radiation effects do not, of course, stop with the current generation. It has long been known that radiation can induce mutations in organisms, and that more than 99 per cent of these mutations are harmful to the race. It is extremely difficult, however, to determine the precise amount of genetic damage that radiation could cause.

Radiation might induce two principal types of mutations — those caused by lethal genes and those caused by non-lethal genes. Lethal genes will cause offspring to die before, during or shortly after birth. According to one set of calculations, it may require 22 generations for lethal mutant genes to die out. Non-lethal mutant genes, 2 per cent of which might show up as obviously defective persons in any one generation, would probably be maintained for more than 50 generations.

In contrast to the many uncertainties regarding genetic damage, there is one certainty: Damage to the human gene pool scarcely begins with this generation. It will still be expressing itself when our current controversies are ancient history.

EDITORIAL

What YOU Can DO for PEACE

What can one person, one of three billion, do to influence the world in a direction away from war, toward peace?

The first thing to do is *think*. The world War II response of the good citizen—to join the military service, work in a defense plant or buy war bonds—is no longer appropriate. Yet, even though the menace is greater now than it was then, most people feel there is little they can do. Except, perhaps, dig a hole in the backyard that may well turn out to be a tomb.

This inertia results primarily from a failure to understand the nature of our problem. As long as fully sovereign nations exist, there will be wars. Differences develop between the states and ultimately there is no way to settle them but through war. If communism were not the threat, we would be opposing some other "ism."

In the pre-nuclear age perhaps we could have settled our differences with communism by means of war and gone on living afterwards more or less as we had been. But, whether we like it or not, we are in the Nuclear-Space Age. Even as matters stand today, it is doubtful whether anything resembling our present civilization could survive a massive thermonuclear exchange. And day by day both sides move closer to capability of total mutual destruction. Even Herman Kahn, the high priest of the rationalizers who hold that we can survive a thermonuclear war, contradicts himself by indicating that a Doomsday Machine capable of destroying the earth could be built for $10 billion.

The inescapable conclusion is that there is only one way out of the peril we are in: We must eliminate the institution of war from civilization. Cannibalism went, slaveholding went, dueling went, child labor went, lynching went, segregation is going and now war must go. If war doesn't go, most of us will.

The abolition of war, although it has been an ideal for many centuries, is just beginning in practical terms. As Walter Millis points out in this issue, "People simply will not consider or talk about the possibilities of peace, because they cannot conceive of a world without war." But conceive they must, and fast.

The first act of the individual who wants to do something for peace must be to accept the desirability and possibility of ending war. In holding this opinion he will learn in some measure how Galileo must have felt when he asserted the world was round. He knew he was right but everybody else knew it was impossible.

In this strange and invisible war against war, the weapons are opinions. Great battles are being fought every day, and as the years go by the fortunes of peace vs. war may be seen waxing and waning. If the peace forces are to win, we will see international institutions grow and lead us to a world of law and order. If we are to lose, some of us may have only a split second to recognize our failure, while others may have the grimmer fate of contemplating it in a world of atomic, bacteriological and chemical poisons.

Since opinions are our weapons, how do we wield them?

Everyone can vote, and write letters to the president, senators, representatives, editors and foreign leaders. Everyone who belongs to a church, club or professional organization can arrange programs dealing with peace problems. Everyone can join a political party and work for a candidate with an intelligent interest in peace problems—or even run as a candidate himself. Everyone can join a peace organization—or several. Everyone can buy UNICEF Christmas cards, showing his support of the United Nations. Everyone can give money to some of the many worthy peace projects that are perpetually starved for funds. And these suggestions by no means exhaust the possibilities.

The person who does nothing has one rationalization that must be dealt with firmly. This is that "there's no use doing any of these things because the Russians would never cooperate anyway." We will not apologize for the Soviet record — particularly its horrendous series of nuclear tests—but we cannot afford to give up hope of finding agreements based on our mutual interest in survival. Difficult as negotiations with the Soviets have been, they have not been totally unproductive. In 1955 the Soviet Union signed a treaty under which it gave up its occupation of part of Austria; last year it signed a pact barring the Cold War from Antarctica; this year it joined other nations at Vienna in signing the Convention on Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities; last month it surprisingly abandoned its opportunity to strangle the U.N. through its demand for a troika in the Secretariat.

As big as is the mote in the Soviet eye, the most urgent job for the U.S. is to get the mote out of its own eye. The Connally Amendment, which provides that the U.S. itself can judge whether or not the World Court has jurisdiction over a case involving the U.S., is still on the books, a situation making a sham of our protestations that we favor world law. Our past positions on arms control and disarmament by and large have been naive, ill-prepared and impractical. Three important forward steps were President Kennedy's strong speech before the U.N. urging practical steps toward the abolition of war, the creation by statute of the U.S. Agency for Arms Control and Disarmament, and the joint U.S.-Soviet statement on principles for achieving general and complete disarmament. But the U.S. has still not set forth workable plans for a United Nations police force, fair and effective means of controlling it, reliable ways to finance it, and for bodies to mediate, arbitrate and adjudicate international disputes. Nor has the U.S. been willing to recognize the obvious fact that realistic negotiations on arms control and disarmament cannot be carried out without the participation of Communist China. (For that matter, the Soviet Union is also refraining from urging that Red China be brought in.) Strong public pressure from individual American citizens can significantly increase the probability of our leadership moving ahead with necessary beginning steps in the direction of a world ruled by law.

They Can't Imagine A Warless World

By Walter Millis

Faced with the terrible dilemma of choosing between thermonuclear war and Communist domination, an analyst finds almost no one will accept as possible his revolutionary solution: Peace.

A little over a year ago I published an article entitled (perhaps a bit overdramatically) "The Peace Game." The idea I thought a reasonably simple one. It seemed plain to me that the strategists and wargamers, toting up their megatons and megadeaths, their "first strike" and "second strike capabilities," their estimates of "acceptable" casualties and of possible survival rates in bomb-shelters, were getting nowhere. Nowhere humanly conceivable, at any rate. Relentlessly pursuing the logic of war in a thermonuclear age, they were in a military stratosphere, far beyond the parameters (to use one of their favorite terms) of human need and behavior. With the future of war as dubious as they made it seem, it occurred to me that it might be worth while to consider the future possibilities of peace.

Would peace really be so dreadful a condition as is usually supposed? Would it really present us with that stark dilemma between being "red or dead" which provides the John Birch Society with its major ammunition? Our modern national societies have come a long way from the days of simple tribal warfare, even from the great imperial wars of antiquity. May they not be approaching a point at which they could dispense with organized war altogether? Would it not be helpful to try to imagine how, under modern conditions, a demilitarized world might be expected to operate? Might it not be possible to "game" a demilitarized world in much the same way that the new experts of violence were "gaming" their world of thermonuclear bombs and intercontinental missiles?

A year or more has passed. My idea has received as much attention as an author could ask. It has evoked a good deal of general comment. It has been discussed at length by groups of learned men. State and Defense have asked for copies. I have re-written the original article several times; audiences have listened to me attentively; I have received gratifying support for carrying the work further. But somehow it has seemed almost impossible to get the idea over. People simply will not consider or talk about the possibilities of peace, because they cannot conceive of a world without war. The idea that a world demilitarized and at peace might be a viable and going world seems extraordinarily difficult to implant. Any number of people have told me how foolish, how unreal, how dangerous this notion is, for every one who has seemed to think it perhaps worth pursuing. And even those willing to grant that once a general peace were established it might be possible to maintain it without the existence of organized war or armaments are stopped by the seemingly insurmountable hurdle: "How do you get from here to there?" How can you possibly make a general peace to begin with, especially when "the other side" so persistently refuses to do so and rejects all our own efforts in that direction?

Mr. Millis, military historian and journalist, is on the staff of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions. His analysis of what a warless world might be like first appeared in the September 24, 1960, issue of Saturday Review *as "The Peace Game." Two booklets published later, "A World Without War" and "Permanent Peace," are available free in single copies from the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Box 4068, Santa Barbara, Calif.*

The conviction that the security and well-being of our society depend upon our maintaining an ability to wage war remains solid and unshaken, even in face of the proposition (which seems at least as clearly demonstrable) that unless we get rid of the ability to wage war there will be no security or well-being for ourselves or anyone else. Almost no one can imagine peace, or will even make the intellectual effort of trying to do so. Peace appears to even the ablest student as synonymous with surrender; and since we have all been taught from infancy that war is better than surrender, this ends the argument. To enter seriously upon any practical plan for general and complete disarmament is simply to invite the Russians to steal a military march on us; while even if such a plan were loyally executed by all parties, it would merely create conditions under which the Communists could capture the globe by non-military means.

The Two Risks

I recently participated in a fairly high-level seminar on military policy and arms control, at the end of which, I thought, the present position of American thought was well summarized. We face, the conclusion ran, a dreadful dilemma between the risk of Communist domination of the world if we do not maintain our nuclear weapons and the risk that the weapons will ultimately blow our civilization to pieces if we do maintain them. Differences of opinion expressed around the table turned almost wholly on the weightings given to these risks. At one end were those to whom the risk of Communist domination was overwhelmingly the greater and who chose "freely," even serenely, to take their own (and civilization's) chances with the

weapons. At the other end were those (none was present at this particular gathering) to whom the overwhelming risk was that of the nuclear extermination of civilization and who were quite willing to take their own (and civilization's) chances with Communist domination of the world. The several in-between positions were devoted in one way or another to the hope of averting both risks. Essentially, they were attempts to use the military power of the nuclear weapons to avert Communist domination of the world, while coming to agreement with the Communist political power to avert the total destruction promised by the weapons systems. Here there is a basic inconsistency — an inconsistency equally apparent, it must be said, in Soviet thought — which makes the in-between positions less than persuasive.

They did not seem to me (nor, I think, to some of their own authors) to provide a valid answer. The seminar rose (for me, at least) under the shadow of a terrible dilemma for which no resolution could be found, leaving the world condemned inescapably to one or the other of two possible catastrophes. I tried to suggest that peace might offer a third possibility; but this dangerous thought was promptly suppressed with the question: "How are you going to make peace if the Russians won't?" and I had no opportunity to attempt an answer.

No one easily accepts irresolvable dilemmas—especially those pointing remorselessly to such frightful consequences. There must be a failure of logic somewhere; or we should be able to devise better logical systems (as the physicists do) which will escape the impasse. In the problem of war and communism, Americans have not so far been able to manage this; but the fault is by no means all on their side. Recently, I had an opportunity to discuss my ideas with some of the Russian scientists who participated at the Stowe conference in September. Particularly, I wanted to learn what ideas they (or the Soviet Government) had formed concerning the nature and probable operation of a world successfully demilitarized under the Khrushchev formula of "general and complete disarmament." As well as I could understand, they had none; they seemed not even to have thought about it.

It seems to me that there is a good deal of reason in the Soviet position on G.C.D. It is, in summary, that none of the world's serious political problems can be resolved without G.C.D., but that once we have attained G.C.D. no serious problems, and very few of any kind, will remain. This, I think, one must be inclined to accept. It clearly accords with my own conviction that a demilitarized world would be a viable one. One must also agree with the Russian position that general disarmament will be impossible unless it is clearly, unequivocally accepted all around as the desired and intended goal. Unless everyone really wants to swim in the disarmament pool, it is of little use to devise schemes under which each will insert a toe; if the water does not prove too cold, he will then go down to his knees; if he can take it up to the knees, he will take it up to the waist, but always reserve full freedom of action to get out and go home to his nuclear fire whenever he thinks the others are not all serious about swimming. No progress has ever been made in this way in the past, and there seems no reason to suppose that progress can be made this way in the future. So far, the Russians are right. There is unlikely to be any significant disarmament unless all are agreed that disarmament is necessary and desirable.

But the Russians with whom I talked, eloquent and quite reasonable as they were in defense of the theory of G.C.D., had nothing to contribute toward creating this general conviction that G.C.D. is desirable. They could not say how they expected the demilitarized world to operate. Did they think that it would lead to Communist domination of the world? Since, as Communists, they presumably believe in the ultimately universal triumph of communism, the significant question was not easy to put to them. The significant question is not whether one believes in the ultimate triumph of communism (or of democracy) but whether one believes that general and complete disarmament will in itself contribute to one or the other result, or will be neutral in effect. To the degree in which G.C.D. is advanced by either side as a means of securing the complete destruction of the other (and the West has been as guilty of such ideas as have the Communists) it obviously has no future. General and complete disarmament can be expected to make headway only as its advocates, Communists as well as Westerners, can present a persuasive picture of the resultant situation as one in which *both* the Communist and the non-Communist worlds can be expected to prosper.

New Logic Sought

I believe that it is possible to construct such a picture, though we will certainly need both Russian and Chinese help if it is to be made persuasive. I believe that the dilemma: "Would you rather be red or dead?" is a highly unreal one. I believe that it is possible to construct, out of the plainly available data about international relations and human motivations, a new logic of international affairs which will not lead to the dreadful impasse which is the best that most current thought on war and foreign policy has been able to offer us. But it may be that these beliefs of mine are silly. A year of effort has left me with the feeling that they are, at least, enormously difficult to convey to others. Maybe it was all a wrong idea. Maybe I should start at once on building my family bomb-shelter, and shopping for the revolver with which to shoot the neighbors who may try to invade it. Maybe I should; but I have no intention of doing so.

REVIEW SECTION

MAY MAN PREVAIL? An Inquiry Into the Facts and Fictions of Foreign Policy. By Erich Fromm. 252 pp. Doubleday and Co., 1961. Hard cover, $4.50. Paperback, 95 cents.

By Thomas P. Whitney

Erich Fromm, a prolific and provocative writer and thinker, has written a book in which he presents a plea for a fundamental reassessment of views on the nature of the Soviet Union as a political entity in world politics and as a social organism, on the value of nuclear power as a deterrent against war, and on the possibilities for world peace. Fromm reaches the conclusion that universal, controlled disarmament is the only path to peace and democracy in the world and that it must be actively and immediately sought.

"May Man Prevail?" starts by stating several of the premises on which American and Western foreign policies are currently based. One is that "communism, represented by the Soviet Union and China, is a revolutionary-imperialist movement out to conquer the world by force or subversion." Another, as Fromm puts it, is that the Communist bloc can be restrained from executing plans for world conquest solely by American and Western deterrent capacity and that therefore in this deterrent capacity lies "the only hope for peace."

Fromm examines these two premises. He concludes that our deterrent capacity, our continual accumulation of weapons of ever-increasing deadliness, not only fails to assure peace but that it almost certainly guarantees war. He considers that thermonuclear war would possibly mean the destruction of humanity and that it would certainly annihilate everything of value in human culture and civilization.

The author sees hope in his analysis of the nature of the Soviet system that it may be possible to end the threat of thermonuclear war. He devotes about a third of his book to this analysis, which constitutes the major pillar of his line of argument. He concludes on the basis of a detailed survey of major aspects of Soviet life that the U.S.S.R. is not aggressive in any revolutionary sense and is not aiming at world domination or world rule. He states that Russia is a "reactionary welfare state" and that its social organism can be described as a "conservative, totalitarian managerialism" ruled by the "dominant class of this system"—the bureaucrats and managers.

Fromm draws a very sharp distinction between Chinese and Soviet communism—but apparently he does not see any grave or inevitable threat to world peace from the Chinese Communists if the Soviet Union and the United States were able to come to agreement on peaceful coexistence, the solution of major world problems and on disarmament.

It follows from the nature of the Soviet system, Fromm thinks, that the current Soviet Communist ruling group is in fact not in favor of Communist revolutions in Asia, Africa, Latin America and elsewhere but has a strong interest in not seeing such revolutions take place since these, as with the case of China, can actually constitute a challenge to the Soviet form of communism. He also believes that the Khrushchev leadership is actually seeking understanding with the United States.

Fromm contends that the U.S. government should be seeking agreement with the Soviet Union on Germany based on recognition of the *status quo* in East Germany and Eastern Europe as a whole in return for guarantees on Berlin's status and access to it. He holds that American policy towards Communist China is sterile and futile and, in fact, has helped make Peking much more aggressive than it otherwise would have been. He asserts that America should be actively favoring the development of independent democratic socialist regimes in underdeveloped countries, including such regimes as that of President Tito in Yugoslavia.

This is quite an inadequate summary of a book which is full of useful insights into both the American and Soviet systems as well as world affairs and the nature of man. The book states very effectively the humanist position and calls for a new vision which can truly inspire, a renaissance of the spirit of humanism and individualism, for a united front for survival.

One can question many points in Fromm's analysis of Soviet society, of course. He seriously underestimates the importance which for the Soviet ruling group, including the Khrushchev leadership, the expansion of Communist rule assumes. He seriously underestimates the extent to which the Soviet ruling group is ensnared in its own ideology and the dynamics of the Soviet position in the world Communist movement. In some measure Fromm fails to understand the character of the Soviet Communist Party elite as distinct from the class of Soviet industrial and economic managers. In a broader sense, one can make the point that Fromm fails to state adequately the necessity of international rule of law as the necessary precondition for any universal disarmament. But these criticisms and the others that can be made cannot seriously diminish the significance of a brilliant work which deserves to reach the widest reading public.

Thomas P. Whitney is a free-lance writer and student of Soviet affairs who spent nine years in postwar Russia as a diplomat and journalist. He is the author of a forthcoming book, "Russia in My Life."

Peace ACTIONS For the Month

Why not add special significance to your holiday greetings this year? UNICEF greeting cards—sold for the benefit of the U.N. Children's Fund — help provide food, medicine and equipment to help sick and hungry children in more than 100 countries. The proceeds from five boxes of UNICEF cards will provide a daily glass of milk for 42 children for a month. For a brochure of cards available, write: U.S. Committee for UNICEF, United Nations, N.Y.

* * *

Let President Kennedy know how you feel about possible U.S. resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. For a cogent argument against resumption, see Ambassador James J. Wadsworth's editorial, "Nuclear Testing Is Not in the National Interest," for the November 18 issue of *Saturday Review*. Wadsworth refutes the claim that national security requires renewed testing in the air.

ON THE PEACE FRONT

By Jack Voelpel

VOW Crosses Border

The Canadian-originated Voice of Women, organized in July, 1960, is on its way toward becoming international in scope. Sections are currently being formed in the U.S., India, Pakistan and New Zealand.

President of the U.S. Section is Mrs. Katherine K. Marshall (1334 Oakridge Drive, Cleveland Heights 21, Ohio). Said Mrs. Marshall recently: "We know that women everywhere are asking themselves the same questions about peace, atomic, biological and chemical warfare, bomb shelters, etc., which prompted us to take our first steps toward providing what we hope will be a beacon, a rallying point for concerned women."

Like the Canadian group, Voice of Women, U.S.A. is organized as a non-partisan "grass roots" movement, asserting that mankind is capable of finding solutions to its problems without resort to general warfare. It seeks to create a climate in which negotiation of peaceful solutions is possible. For information, write Mrs. Marshall.

'Internships' for Peace

"I am interested in making a practical contribution to the cause of world peace because I am anxiously concerned about man's newly-found power to destroy himself and civilization with him." So said one young applicant for a grant under a "peace intern" program.

Administered by the Jane Addams Peace Association, Inc. (345 East 46th St., New York 17, N.Y.), the Willam I. and Hannah Clothier Hull Memorial Fund is now beginning its third-year program.

Established in memory of William Hull, who was professor of history and international relations at Swarthmore, and his wife, who was president of the U.S. Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the fund has $10,000 which is to be distributed in approximately 10 years. It provides scholarships for research or for intern experience on the staffs of peace organizations with the objective of creating a group of trained peace workers.

Those receiving grants have ranged in age from 19 to 32. Deadline date for applications for the 1962 awards is December 31.

Space Control Urged

"Our government should make additional efforts to seek safeguarded agreements banning weapons of mass destruction in space before they become accomplished facts."

So said more than 60 national leaders who attended the 20th American Assembly at Arden House, October 19-22, on "Outer Space: Prospects for Man and Society." Participants included Lt. General B. A. Schriever, U.S.A.F.; Francis T. P. Plimpton, deputy representative of the U.S. to the U.N.; Rep. James G. Fulton of Pennsylvania, and others.

The group's final report urged: "Short of a genuine disarmament agreement, the search needs to be expanded for areas of agreement designed to enhance the stability of the military environment. To that end we recommend accelerated studies inside and outside the government on the technical and political problems of arms control in space."

Papers presented to the conference will be issued in book form by Prentice-Hall under the same title as the Assembly theme.

A Growing 'Strategy for Peace'

By Melvin Dubin

It may have been the worsening world situation or it may have been a normal process of growth. Whatever it was, the Third Strategy for Peace Conference showed a maturity not attained at either of the previous meetings. Gathering at Warrenton, Virginia, from Oct. 19-22 under the chairmanship of Tom Slick and C. Maxwell Stanley, the group consisted of about a hundred leaders of business, government, academic and philanthropic organizations.

At the first Strategy for Peace Conference, held over a year ago, many of the participants seemed to arrive with hardened beliefs in one of the various approaches to achieving peace. The conference could do little more than sort out the enormous international problems and recommend to the government that permanent agencies be established to carry out intensive studies of arms control and disarmament.

The second conference, too, strove to extricate itself from the web of secondary questions and highly conjectural discussions. However, some essential objectives were recognized: the shifting of national military forces over to international forces, improving the U.N. and other international organizations, and expansion of world development on a multilateral basis.

As the participants from many walks of life exchanged information and views, their special approaches yielded to more flexible understanding. The latest conference, therefore, was able to proceed immediately to the most advanced point in U.S. official thinking: the U.S. Program for General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, announced last September. This plan, the significance of which has not yet been widely appreciated, outlines a three-phase program under which national armaments can be reduced and brought under the control of an International Disarmament Organization (I.D.O.).

After considering the program in detail, the conference urged that the U.S. elaborate it into more specific terms. In particular, it called for added emphasis on the non-military aspects of arms control and disarmament, such as extending the jurisdiction of international law, giving the U.N. and I.D.O. dependable sources of income, controlling I.D.O. through U.N. political machinery and preserving outer space for peaceful uses.

The conference also asked the U.S. government to consider the concept of GRIT (graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction), as set forth by Charles E. Osgood, of the University of Illinois. (See *War/Peace Report*, November, pages 3-5.)

So far, the Strategy for Peace Conference has concerned itself with suggestions to government authorities. The question of obtaining popular support for these new proposals has been raised and generally shunted aside. Perhaps future conferences will seek means to convey their enlightenment to the public.

Mr. Dubin, president of the Slant/Fin Radiator Corp., Richmond Hill, N.Y., has participated in all three the Strategy for Peace Conferences.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

More Light, Less Heat

To the Editor:

The article in the November issue, "A Psychologist's Cure for the Arms Race," by Charles Osgood, seems to me to contain more light and less heat than anything I have read since the Cold War began!

MARIAN K. BROWN
Salem, Mass.

GRIT Urged Now

To the Editor:

Now is as good a time as any for the U.S. to launch the program of GRIT that Charles Osgood wrote of in the last issue.

I would suggest we start by announcing that we will refrain from nuclear testing in the atmosphere indefinitely. We could invite reciprocation in kind and, as well, ask that the Communists remove that wall through Berlin.

CONRAD BROWN
Yorktown Heights, N.Y.

'5 Per Cent Plan' Hit

To the Editor:

Is W. H. Ferry serious about his "5 Per Cent Community Shelter Plan" in the November issue? It's hideous! Or is he just trying to provoke us into a little serious thinking about civil defense?

IRENE MILLER
New York, N.Y.

Ike Began Law Day

To the Editor:

I wish to correct an error in your June issue. It is stated, "The first official Law Day for the U.S. was proclaimed on May 1 by President Kennedy. Unofficially celebrated up to this time, the new observance was America's answer to the traditional military-oriented May Day celebrations in other parts of the world."

Law Day, May 1, was officially proclaimed for the first time by President Eisenhower on May 1, 1958.

I also believe the suggestion that Law Day in some way is an answer to the Russian May Day is a childish one and unworthy of a great nation, even though I realize that you are not the first to make this suggestion. The tradition of May Day antedates the Soviet Union by many centuries. Law Day, as an expression of hope for survival, is in keeping with this ancient tradition.

DAVID MERRIELL
Santa Barbara, Calif.

A new song in the folk tradition, "Let Me Die . . . With My Head Held High," is available to peace organizations—and might even help them with fund-raising.

D. Robinson and Howard Plummer, song-writing veterans who wrote the haunting words and melody state that if the song "goes", half of the net is pledged to the Committee for Non-Violent Action, United World Federalists and other peace groups. Free copies of the sheet music are available to professional and non-professional singers from HAP Music Inc., 200 West 57th Street, New York 19, N.Y. The refrain goes:

Let me die . . . with my head held high!
Not alive in a grave in the ground.
Let me die . . . looking death in the eye!
Not afraid of the sight or the sound.
Let our only shelter be
Heaven's open canopy . . . should that man-made sun set
Hell on you and me!

PEACE FOR CHRISTMAS

YOU should do something meaningful for the cause of peace this Christmas. Give the book EINSTEIN ON PEACE or a one-year subscription to WAR/PEACE REPORT, or both.

EINSTEIN ON PEACE

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—Barbara Ward in *New York Times Book Review*

Edited by Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden. Preface by Bertrand Russell. 704 pages. $8.50. SIMON AND SCHUSTER, PUBLISHERS

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